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The Dehumanizing Illusion of Religion-and-Violence Arguments  
 
Like a fun-house mirror, Western conceptions of religion and violence have distorted the 
truth in a way that is severely damaging to us all.  The relationship between religion and violence 
is a subjective connection used to justify political goals.  Because the West purports itself to be 
secular, the use of religion and violence arguments allows people to dehumanize religious people 
and societies and to therefore justify violence done against them for political purposes.   
According to Terror in the Mind of God author Mark Juergensmeyer, for those committing 
violence, it  
 
requires an enormous amount of moral presumption for the perpetrators of these 
acts to justify the destruction of property on a massive scale or to condone a brutal 
attack on another life, especially the life of someone one scarcely knows and 
against whom one bears no personal enmity.1   
 
Othering, the fear of someone different from oneself and subsequent prejudice, comes into play 
as an important factor in the psychological need for religion-and-violence arguments. 
Religion-and-violence arguments lead secular Westerners to believe that their wars are 
justified because they are not religiously motivated.  William T. Cavanaugh is a professor of 
theology at DePaul University who wrote The Myth of Religious Violence.  He uses the 
functionalist perspective on defining religion.  This perspective uses definitions that are “based 
not on the content or substance of a belief system but on the way that such a system functions, 
that is, the social, psychological, and political tasks that it performs in a given context.”2   
                                                          
1 Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (University of California 
Press: Berkeley/ Los Angeles/ London, 2000), p. 11 
2 Cavanaugh, William T. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 105-106 
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Using this approach to defining religion has “the advantage of being based on empirical 
observation [assuming that observation can be objective and unbiased, which it really cannot] of 
people’s actual behavior, and not simply on claims of what they believe in the confines of some 
interior and unobservable mental state.”3  This perspective erases subjective boundaries between 
established world religions and removes the ability of religion-and-violence apologists to justify 
their arguments.  If ‘religion’ is not defined through professed belief, it becomes less clear what 
does or does not count as religious.  Nationalism and capitalism, for example, under this 
definition, can be considered religious concepts.  If this is true, then the line differentiating state 
from religion disappears.  He asserts that religious violence and secular violence cannot be 
meaningfully or usefully separated as logical categories of violence.4  ‘State violence’ and 
‘religious violence’ then, are false classifications.   
Furthermore, he argues that the use of religion as a coherent category is nothing more than an 
expression of state power. “There is no transhistorical or transcultural concept of religion,” and 
the “attempt to say that there is a transhistorical and transcultural concept of religion that is 
separable from secular phenomena is itself part of a particular configuration of power, that of the 
modern, liberal nation-state as it developed in the West.”5  This application of the term ‘religion,’ 
Cavanaugh claims, is used to justify ‘secular’ violence.6  He proclaims that, 
 
For its many avid consumers in the West, the myth of religious violence serves on 
the domestic scene to marginalize discourses and practices labeled religious, 
especially those associated with Christian church and, particularly in Europe, with 
Muslim groups. The myth helps to reinforce adherence to a secular social order 
and the nation-state that guarantees it.7 
 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 106 
4 Ibid., p. 3-4 
5 Ibid., p. 59 
6 Ibid., p. 3-4 
7 Ibid., p. 225-226 
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Additionally, he expands this argument to account for the psychological need for an Other in this 
equation,  
 
The myth of religious violence…provides secular social orders with a stock 
character, the religious fanatic, to serve as enemy…Violence feeds on the need for 
enemies, the need to separate us from them. Such binary ways of dividing the 
world make the world understandable for us, but they also make the world 
unlivable for many. Doing away with the myth of religious violence is one way of 
resisting such binaries and, perhaps, turning some enemies into friends.8 
 
 
 As Cavanaugh elucidates, religion-and-violence arguments create an Other, a fanatical being or 
group against whom rational, state-sanctioned violence is morally acceptable.  The Other is 
someone who is different from oneself and becomes dehumanized through the discourse of 
assumptions underlying religion-and-violence justifications.  This Other allows the west to carry 
out violence against its enemies without incurring any moral compunction. 
 
Žižek 
The supposedly secular west is the true engineer of world tyranny, which flies in the face of 
western religion-and-violence arguments.  The west uses subjective argumentation to support 
their political goals.  Slavoj Žižek is a cultural critic, psychoanalytic philosopher, and Hegelian 
Marxist from Slovenia; he wrote Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, which introduces the 
concepts of objective and subjective violence.  Objective violence in western society is “the 
subtler form of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation, including the 
threat of violence.”9  Systemic violence is a facet of objective violence.  It is the violence that 
results from capitalist political and economic arrangements, the “often catastrophic consequences 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p. 5, 230 
9 Žižek, Slavoj. Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), p. 9 
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of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”10  Symbolic violence, the 
other form of objective violence, is the violence that is “embodied in language,” or violence that 
is achieved through specific use of language.11   
Žižek’s exploration of the way violence and conceptions of violence work in our society 
reveals that violence is a deep-rooted part of our western civilization.  Colonialism and later 
imperialism are good examples for how violent action was taken against others for capital gain.  
In this example, the societal values promoting imperialism represent systemic violence, and 
Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden would represent symbolic violence.  The physical 
violence enacted against those who were subjugated under western imperialism and colonialism 
fall under the category of subjective violence.  Subjective violence, the effect caused by 
objective violence, is “enacted by social agents, evil individuals, disciplined repressive 
apparatuses, or fanatical crowds”; therefore, subjective violence is always “attributable to 
concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions.”12  Žižek’s analysis of subjective violence 
illuminates how the idea of the Other, in this case, the perpetrator of violence, is usually 
characterized as “evil” or “fanatical.”13  His discussion also shows how othering is subjective: in 
the colonialism example, the west are the perpetrators of violence and thereby become the evil, 
irrational Others; in the west’s perspective, the evil, zealous Other is usually the subject of their 
colonization.  One cannot ignore the irony of subjective violence and Othering.   
Another important contribution from Žižek are his sideways glances at violence: studying 
violence and its effects without directly, emotionally engaging with the material.  This technique 
is necessary because obsessing over grotesque detail obscures the reality of the situation, 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 2 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 3, 11, 13 
13 Ibid., p. 11, 13 
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allowing further violence against those who have been dehumanized by religion-and-violence 
arguments.  Žižek demonstrates in his book Violence how societies understand, obscure and deny 
the sources of violence.  When we emotionally engage with violent material, we become 
bystanders of violence and totally complicit in systems of institutional and interpersonal 
violence.14  Our instinctive outrage at the physical manifestations of violence (e.g. 9/11, the Paris 
attacks of 2015, or the massacre in Nice on Bastille Day 2016) blind us to the objective violence 
of the world, a violence where we are perpetrators and rather than the victims or blameless 
bystanders we sometimes pretend to be. All we see are apparently inexplicable actions that 
disturb the assumed peace of everyday life.15  In other words, we become so wrapped up with 
reacting emotionally to outright displays of violence that the reality of violence and its effects are 
lost.  By failing to recognize the source of violence – the west, according to Žižek – we become 
complicit in the atrocities committed against others through the interplay of objective and 
subjective violence.   
 
Thích Nhất Hạnh 
Bringing compassion into the analysis of violence prohibits the othering of one’s enemies 
and allows them to be humanized.  Thích Nhất Hạnh is a Vietnamese Buddhist monk and 
globally renowned peace activist.  Love in Action is a collection of two decades’ worth of Thích 
Nhất Hạnh’s writings on the importance of peace, reconciliation, and nonviolence.  Included in 
this collection is the play The Path of Return Continues the Journey, which illuminates some of 
Thích Nhất Hạnh’s views on violence and how it should be dealt with.  First, he maintains that it 
is not humans we’re fighting against, but evil, hatred, and fear.  In the play, a character 
                                                          
14 Ibid., p. 11 
15 Ibid., p. 27, 37 
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rhetorically asks, “Who is really killing us? It is fear, hatred, and prejudice.”16 Displacing fear 
and hatred onto others results in violent action taken against those we normally would not harm.  
Fear and hatred themselves are emotions – abstract concepts against which it is difficult to do 
battle.  By personifying fear and hatred in the faces of our enemies, we create a physical entity 
against which we can channel our emotions.  One could argue that having a physical way to 
challenge fear, anger, and hatred is a result of psychological need for self-efficacy.  However, 
more constructive ways to deal with these emotions are available (i.e. meditation, artistic 
expression).  Dealing with fear and hatred through physical violence makes othering necessary to 
maintain clear consciences and the façade of moral purity.  Hatred and fear blind us, leading to 
othering. 
 
Tuan: I agree with you, Sister Mai. “Youth for Social Service” is just a label they 
pasted on the objects of their hatred and fear, an object that exists only in their 
perception. It has nothing to do with us as persons. They shot only at the object of 
their fear and hatred, but because they had pasted the label of this object on us, 
they ended up shooting us, and we died by mistake. They killed us because they 
truly did not know who we were.   
Hy: Brother Tuan, are you speaking about wrong perceptions? Hatred and fear 
blind us. We no longer see each other. We see only the faces of monsters, and that 
gives us the courage to destroy each other.17   
 
 
In this example, Hy, Tuan and company are the victims of physical violence – the manifestation 
of fear and hatred on their countenances by their enemies.  Tuan notes that the men who killed 
them did not know them, and Hy extrapolates this observation to conclude that only in not 
knowing them could the men who killed them have had the courage to do so.  This exchange of 
thoughts demonstrates the psychological need for an enemy to be othered before violence against 
                                                          
16Thích Nhất Hạnh. Love in Action: Writings on Nonviolent Social Change (Berkeley, CA: Parralax Press, 1993), p. 32 
17 Ibid., p. 30 
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them can be conscionably rationalized and carried out.  Individual men are not evil, societal 
pressures cause evil.   
 
Mai: You do not understand, Tho. The ones who killed you were only obeying the 
orders of their superiors. And those superiors were also victims. Yet those who 
shot you did show their human qualities. They hesitated, not wanting to kill you, 
fighting against themselves. They had to carry out their orders because they were 
crushed between the hammer and the anvil, the orders and their families, their 
jobs, even their lives. Their consciences and perceptions had been greatly 
obscured.  
Hy: One man even exclaimed, “God, you are all so young!” It was not just an 
expression of pity for us, but also a protest against his own fate.   
Mai: Men kill because, on the one hand, they are pushed into a position where 
they must kill.18    
 
This dialogue between Mai and Hy reveals that society, not individuals, is evil and at fault for 
violence.  Mai prompts her companions to be compassionate, to understand that the men who 
killed them did not do so for the sheer pleasure of committing murder but because they were 
socially obligated to do so.  She further encourages her group to remember that all men are 
subject to the same pressures and the consequences of those pressures.  It was not the case that 
the men who killed Hy, Tho, and Tuan were inherently evil, as conventional western othering 
philosophies would suggest.  They were victims in another way, forced to commit atrocities in 
the name of the abstract – society, family, and fate – that defied their moral codes.   
 
The Islamic State 
Each theorist’s ideas can be applied to the case study of ISIS.  ISIS, or the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria, is a terrorist organization founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  It began as an off-
shoot from al-Qaeda, but has since become far more brutal in its actions and more decisive in its 
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 31 
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political standpoint.  ISIS believes in re-establishing a caliphate (they have installed their current 
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the new caliph) and bringing about the apocalypse.  They 
consider themselves to be the purest Muslims and actively exterminate those who disagree with 
their ideology.  ISIS takes Cavanaugh’s theories on using religion to justify violence and flips it 
on its head.  Using religion to justify violence can be used two ways: the way the west uses it and 
the way ISIS uses it.  This tactic, “acting in the name of Islam means that, for the ignorant at 
least, the groups have some legitimacy for their actions...They can pretend it is not just about 
power and money.”19  ISIS uses religious doctrine to advance their political goals, a tactic 
supposedly designed to grant them more legitimacy.20   
As can be seen in this case study, religion can be used not only to justify action taken against 
those perceived to be religiously fanatical by the rational, sane, secular state, but religion can 
also be used to justify political action in order to garner the sympathy of a religious population.  
Political players understands that power is maintained through the support of the masses.  The 
way to gain the support of the public is to use their dominant ideology: In the United States, for 
example, the dominating idea of the separation of church and state pervades the post-
Enlightenment society; in Iraq and Syria, the majority of the population is devoutly Muslim.  
Religious justifications are used correspondingly by each population’s respective political power.  
While some philosophical evidence exists to support the claim that ISIS is a religious 
organization and many experts agree that ISIS is not religiously motivated.  If ISIS is not, in fact, 
a religious organization, then religion-and-violence arguments lose their power.  Using Žižek’s 
sideways glances allow for a more objective look at what ISIS does; it is crucial to understand 
one’s enemies in order for them to be defeated.  We “need to get acquainted with the Islamic 
                                                          





State’s intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead 
help it self-immolate in its own excessive zeal.”21  This is not to say that religion has no role at 
all in ISIS and what they’re doing, but it is merely “a role of justification...It’s not why they do 
this [or] why young people” join their crusade.22   
Unfortunately for those who employ this tactic, “highlighting only the role of religion in the 
radicalization process to the exclusion of, or above, other factors is short-sighted.”23  Engaging 
directly in this way with ISIS and the horrors they’ve wrought leads to anger, fear, and hatred.  
These emotions lead to the psychological need for a monstrous, physical Other against whom our 
anger can be railed.  In the west, the popular methodology for creating an Other are religion-and-
violence arguments.  However, given the evidence that ISIS is not actually religiously motivated, 
these arguments fall apart.  It is essential that these arguments are dismantled so that ISIS can be 
dealt with rationally. Humanizing ISIS, in the way that Thích Nhất Hạnh encourages, is essential 
to understanding and eventually defeating them.  People join ISIS out of anger against the 
United States for what happened in Iraq similarly to American military recruits who joined after 
9/11.  These are emotional, reactionary responses.   
A major problem currently affecting the west is fundamental attribution error.  Fundamental 
attribution error can be described as “the phenomenon in which we place excessive emphasis on 
internal motivations to explain the behavior of others...rather than considering the relevant 
external factors.”24  In other words, we fall prey to the tendency to view our own actions as 
                                                          
21 Wood, Graeme. “What ISIS Really Wants” The Atlantic, March 2015. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ 
 





determined by circumstance, but rarely extend this privilege to others.25  Applying Thích Nhất 
Hạnh’s lessons on compassion and understanding to ISIS lead to the revelation that this terrorist 
organization, while a fearsome entity in itself, is made up of humans who are motivated by the 
same things we are – family, society, identity, and emotions.  Forgetting that they are human, 
using religion-and-violence arguments to purposefully dehumanize them, is a mistake that, for 
humanity’s sake, we cannot afford.   
Religion-and-violence arguments dehumanize our enemies, therefore justifying and 
obscuring the reality of violence committed against them.  Religion-and-violence arguments 
create a dehumanized, fanatical Other against whom rational, secular wars are considered 
justified.  The west’s fully engaged view of violence leads to the participation in/propagation of 
objective and subjective violence as well as a cloudy view of the reality of violence and its 
effects on others.  Compassion and understanding of an enemy’s human aspects counteracts the 
western tendency to other/dehumanize those it opposes.  The lesson here seems to be: quit using 
religion as a justification for committing violence both against the religious for being religious as 
well as against the secular for not being religious.  As Ellen DeGeneres would say, we should all 




There are some great ideas in here but they need to be reorganized a bit to flow better. I’m 
not super clear on exactly what you are trying to say, and it is difficult to work with this many 
moving parts without laying them out super clearly.  




As well, make sure you’re paying attention to grammar/when things should be capitalized. 
Look through the readings to see how other authors format if you are unsure.  
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